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Core Curriculum Seminars 
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                                                        Signature III Seminar 
 
                                                                  K.C. Choi 
                                                 Department of Religious Studies 
 
 
 The two-day seminar offered a good window into the research interests of my Seton Hall 
University colleagues in departments other than my own.  Such a forum to listen, converse, and 
exchange ideas with a broad spectrum of fellow faculty members are few, so I was appreciative of 
the opportunity to do so under the framework of Signature III.  A recurring question for me has 
been the issue of how the various research programs (or course proposals) might reflect or fit into 
what can be called the Catholic intellectual tradition (CIT).  To be sure, CIT is itself something more 
amorphous than rigidly defined, so in this respect, the many course proposals that were presented 
can be seen as part of or contributing to CIT in some way.  But is there a conceptual framework that 
can help us (maybe, just help me) to better understand how the work of colleagues in various fields 
represents CIT?   
 
 To some extent, course proposals from religious studies/theology and philosophy are the 
easier cases.  The harder cases are those from the social sciences, business, nursing, and so on.  Our 
moderator John Haughey’s reflection that CIT might be better understood as the Catholic 
anthropological tradition is one that continues to resonate with me.  I would modify it slightly—a 
linguistic reformulation—and posit the Catholic humanistic tradition, and propose this as a conceptual 
framework that might help us to better see how the various course proposals reflect the intentions 
of the Signature III core. 
 
 The very idea of Christian humanism, to be sure, is today a contested notion, at least within 
the academic fields of religious studies and theology.  Much of the controversy centers around issues 
of identity, traditionalism, ecclesial particularity, challenges of modernity (and post-modernity, if 
there is such a thing), the prospects for mutual understanding, and so on.  But despite the “politics” 
of Christian humanism, Christian humanism as a conceptual framework for Signature III can 
illumine in a constructive manner how the work of all the disciplines contributes to the catholicity of 
Seton Hall and, correlatively, represents the spirit of the Catholic intellectual tradition.  The great 
twentieth-century, Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner is insightful in this regard.  Again, like the idea of 
Christian humanism, Rahner too is now a contested figure (after all, he was one of the leading 
intellectual catalysts for the contemporary “revival” of Christian humanism).  But the level of 
disagreement he now engenders within Catholic and broader Christian communities are good 
indications that his work is serious enough to wrangle over and thus certainly worthy for us at Seton 
Hall to consider more seriously.      
 
 While space does not allow for a full treatment of what Rahner has to say about Christian 
humanism, it suffices for our purposes to note that he begins with a theological account of why the 
sphere of human affairs ought to be a critical focus for both believers and non-believers.  To make it 
short, the drama of salvation leads to what Rahner calls the unity of love of God and love of 
neighbor.  This means that all persons are called to love God, a love that is manifested concretely 
when we love the neighbor (in this respect, we can say that all persons are called to love neighbor in 
their call to love God).  The upshot of all this is that the salvation of the individual person is not 
achieved in some sort of esoteric spirituality or in splendid isolation outside from human history.  
Rather, it is fully achieved in the human sphere, in all its dimensions (personal, public, economic, 
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political, cultural), when, to be more specific, she serves her fellow-persons in self-less responsibility 
and freedom.  This is why Rahner thinks that Christian theology must always be “political theology,” 
since theology—as intellectual reflection and examination of God’s activity in the world and, 
correlatively, humanity’s response to such activity in the world—must always remind us of what it 
means to be human: to love God, which is to love the neighbor as she exists in all spheres of worldly 
life.1   Thus theology as political theology is also describable as “practical theology,” which is to say a 
theology that informs humanity of what it means to love, how to love, or the manner in which one 
ought to practice her call to love neighbor in response to God’s love for her.2   This love is not an 
ahistorical, spiritualized love, but a love that manifests itself in the world; after all, the human person 
is a social being who exists in political communities, participates in civic societies and economic 
systems, is a member of a family, seeks friendships.      
 
 In referring to political or practical theology, Rahner is trying to suggest that Christianity 
cannot above all be neglectful of what he refers to as the “humane future.”3  It is in this sense that 
Rahner thinks that Christian theology is a humanistic endeavor, that is, an endeavor that seeks to 
further understanding of human nature and to pursue the fullness of human personhood in the 
world.  And insofar as theology’s task is humanistic in the manner described, Rahner thinks that 
Christian theology should exist in solidarity with other humanisms or the non-theological disciplines.  
This is a striking statement in its recognition of other academic, scholarly disciplines as partners to 
theology in their concern for furthering understanding of the human person and the pursuit of a 
humane future.  In fact, Rahner at times can be read as suggesting that the other disciplines or 
humanisms may be better positioned and equipped to deepen such knowledge of human personhood.   
 
For Rahner, one can call “Christianity Humanism” insofar as “it can enter into dialogue with 
other humanisms.”4  But it must be made clear that while Christianity enters such dialogue with the 
aim of learning more deeply about what is necessary for a humane future, such learning in turn 
entails the recognition by the other humanisms that their claims about the human person are not 
absolute, but must be seen as contributing to the fullness of what it means to be human in the 
world.  For Rahner, the task of dialogue is to gain “clearer awareness of those hoped-for aspects of 
the future which have as yet been anticipated only dimly—justice, freedom, dignity, unity and diversity in 
society.”5   In other words, theology must learn from the other humanisms if it is to better 
contribute to a humane future, but in doing so the other humanisms must take it upon themselves to 
affirm that their findings about the human person are not the singular answer to the question of a 
humane future, that is, to the promotion of “justice, freedom, dignity, unity and diversity in society.”  
Such matters cannot be resolved by the work of only one discipline (as if one discipline can have the 
“future tucked away in his pocket like a complete five-year plan”6, but requires mutual collaboration 
of all.  As Rahner opines, “Must Christian and non-Christian humanists be enemies?  I do not think 
so, provided that both sides realize that their obligations are to the future….”7  The task of theology 
and the non-theological disciplines is to work together as humanists, which is to say, to contribute in 
mutually sustaining ways to the humane future, a future of “justice, freedom, dignity, unity and 
diversity in society.”  This task is frustrated when one discipline claims that it knows once and for all 
what that future is.  What that future is, theology cannot determine on its own, but only by 
collaborating with its humanist partners.  The fullness of the future—the humane future—belongs 
to God, as Rahner suggests, and not to any one humanism, whether theology or the non-theological 
disciplines.          
 
 I have left out many of the more technical, nuanced details of Rahner’s account of Christian 
humanism (what I have described above may be too technical already).  But what I have registered 
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thus far illumines enough why Rahner thought that dialogue between non-Christians and Christians 
is necessary, or why he thought that pluralistic discourse (discourse between all the humanisms) is 
necessary.  Such discourse, I think, was reflected in some measure at our Signature III seminar.  And 
I want to propose that a stronger sensibility to the kind of Christian humanism Rahner articulates 
can make all of our various courses cohere in such a way as to reflect the fullness of the Catholic 
intellectual tradition at Seton Hall.  If there is anything to be taken away from Rahner’s vision of 
Christian humanism is that the task of a Catholic university—as a society of various humanisms—is 
mutual collaboration toward the fullness of human personhood, i.e., toward a humane future, “justice, 
freedom, dignity, unity and diversity in society.”  The mere expansion of knowledge, therefore, is 
hardly adequate for a Catholic university; instead, the task is the expansion of knowledge in the 
service of this fullness.  In more theological terms, whatever our discipline, our task as 
scholars/educators is self-realization in selfless love to others; it is to engender a capacious love; or, 
it is to ready ourselves and our students to love neighbor, whether in the political or non-political, in 
the public or private spheres, in the religious realm or the secular.  And such readiness to love is, 
ultimately, an anticipation and openness to the Kingdom of God.   
 
                                                             ****** 
 
 The Signature III course I wish to propose and develop is a course that considers the 
question of cultural diversity.  As I articulated during the seminar, the question, more specifically, is 
what it might mean to recognize the cultural identity of a person or persons.  In short, this course is 
about the meaning and significance (or perhaps the possibilities) of cultural pluralism—or 
multiculturalism, call it what you like.  Many of us take cultural pluralism for granted nowadays (just 
look at our tri-state region), but it exists in strong tension with what has been a more typical political 
philosophy in the modern U.S.: participation in the “public” requires neutrality, which means 
cultural—whether ethnic, racial, or religious—identity is confined to the “private” sphere.  But to 
what extent does such a political philosophy diminish human personhood?  Alternatively, to what 
extent should plural, cultural expression be allowed in the public?  At the heart of such questions is 
whether cultural pluralism is a good.  Accordingly, the aim of the course is to explore in what 
normative sense cultural pluralism can be considered a public good—what is the limit and extent of 
this good?   
 
In the spirit of the Christian humanism described above, I would like to entertain the 
foregoing questions from a theological framework (primarily Catholic but one that also includes the 
wider Christian tradition) that is in dialogue with a number of non-theological perspectives 
(philosophy, sociology, and law in particular).  As a way of framing the question of cultural pluralism 
and indicating the contemporary salience of the question, the course will begin with a number of 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on affirmative action, school busing, and desegregation, as well as 
explore current political debates on immigration reform and citizenship.  The course will then turn 
to a theological exploration of cultural pluralism through the themes of freedom, the nature of truth, 
the relationship between church and state, and the role of religion in society, just to name a few.  
Readings will draw from Vatican II documents, John Courtney Murray, S.J. (a contributor to Vatican 
II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom), Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, the Mennonite John Howard Yoder 
(a long-time theologian at Notre Dame), Pope John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor, and others within the 
Catholic-Christian intellectual tradition.  This theological exploration of cultural pluralism will then 
dialogue with other non-theological reflections (political theory and sociology, political and moral 
philosophy).  For instance, this section of the course will draw on the works of Alasdair MacIntyre, 
John Dewey, and Amy Gutmann, and the more recent treatments of cosmopolitanism by K. 
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Anthony Appiah and Martha Nussbaum.  With all of this, my hope is that students taking the course 
will be able to better articulate how Christianity can constructively contribute to the larger public 
discussion on the contemporary challenges of cultural pluralism in law, politics, and religion.   




1 Theological Investigations [or TI], Vol. IX, p. 195).   
2 TI, IX, p. 195 
3 TI, IX, p. 201 
4 TI, IX, p. 194).   
5 TI, IX, p. 203, emphasis added 
6 TI, IX, p. 203 
7 TI, IX, pp. 202-203 
Signature III and the Hermeneutical Circle 
 
Anthony L. Haynor 
Department of Anthropology and Sociology 
 
 
 In attempting to make sense of the charge to us to develop Signature III courses within our 
disciplines, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of the “hermeneutical circle” (drawing on his teacher, 
Heidegger) is both instructive and illuminating. Gadamer developed this influential notion most 
clearly in his landmark work, Truth and Method (originally published as Wahrheit and Methode in 1965).    
 
For starters, both Catholic thought, on the one hand, and the various disciplines, on the oth-
er, are “horizons” or “traditions.”  As the philosopher, Thomas Nagel expressed it, there is no such 
thing as a “view from nowhere.”  Yet it is precisely such “decentering” and “decontextualizing” that 
many argue was the hallmark of classicist and, later, Enlightenment thought (to which the Counter-
Enlightenment responded).  For Gadamer, human beings can “interpret” objects (e.g. other people, 
the so-called natural world, God, or most relevant to the present discussion, texts of one kind or 
another) only through the horizons that they bring to their engagement with them.  But, what is a 
“horizon?”   Simply put, it refers to a perspective or vantage point on the world that is rooted in 
presuppositions (“prejudices” according to Gadamer) that guide, structure, and make possible our 
meaningful connectedness to it.  Gadamer tends to use “horizon” and “tradition” interchangeably, 
which presents a bit of a problem.  For a “tradition” requires that there be an “authority” of some 
kind (a “guardian” group according to Anthony Giddens) in whom one trusts to interpret the 
“teaching” by virtue of the “legitimacy” that is invested in the authority.  A tradition is also characte-
rized by a clear sense of peoplehood that is rooted in a shared ancestry, a shared present, and a 
shared future.  One of the challenges that we face in contemporary education is that many of our 
students (even or perhaps especially those from a nominally Catholic background) do not subscribe 
to a Catholic tradition as defined above.  If we now live increasingly (certainly not exclusively) in a 
“post-traditional” society (to use Giddens’ phrase), does that mean that we live in a society devoid of 
“horizons?”  This is the problem with equating “horizon” and “tradition.”  While it is most definite-
ly the case that many of our students are impoverished when it comes to their “traditional” moor-
ings (which have become increasingly contentless and vacuous), this does not meant that they do 
not have “horizons,” however incoherent and fragmented we might think they are.  One of our 
challenges as a faculty is to get our students to understand what their horizons are (whether “tradi-
tional” or not) and how they intersect with the texts in which we ask them to be engaged.  
 
Hermeneutics as the study of interpretation involves by definition an interpreter and some-
thing (e.g. a text) to be interpreted.   Within the context of Signature III courses, the interpreter can 
fall into a number of categories.  First and foremost, there is the “student” as interpreter.  One thing 
that should be fostered in Signature III courses is the students’ self-understanding of their horizons 
in relation to their effort to make both disciplinary and Catholic texts intelligible and meaningful.  
One possibility is that they embrace a horizon outside of their discipline and Catholicism that either 
prevents both disciplinary and Catholic traditions from resonating or that frame their understanding 
of both their discipline and Catholicism.   Another possibility is that they embrace a disciplinary ho-
rizon that can be “applied” to Catholic thought.  Another possibility is that they embrace a decidedly 
Catholic horizon that can be “applied” to their discipline. Finally, their horizon can take a hybrid 
form, in which their double commitment to a discipline and to Catholicism continually inform each 
other.  Overlaying this is the professor as interpreter. It is the responsibility (one could reasonably 
argue the “moral” responsibility) of the professor to make transparent the “horizons” (that is the 
prejudices) that are guiding his or her perspective on the text.  This is course assumes that the pro-
fessor is fully aware of what those prejudices are.  So, what should also be fostered in Signature III 
courses is an enhanced self-understanding on the part of professors as to their horizons (and corres-
ponding prejudices).  This could run the gamut from an uncritical acceptance of secular disciplinary 
norms to a blind allegiance to Church authority, to a dogmatic skepticism of all attempts to uncover 
or discover the truth, or even to Catholic bashing.  The third category of interpreter would be texts 
that attempt to make sense of the texts under consideration in the course.  Of course, their relevance 
in understanding the text as object depends on the horizons adopted by those (namely students and 
the professor) who are drawing on them.  
 
The “hermeneutical circle” commences with the process in which a text can derive its mean-
ing only in terms of how the interpreter’s horizon is “applied” to it.  This having been said, according 
to Gadamer, the very process of engaging the text as object implicates the horizon itself.  The hori-
zon that makes possible the “conversation” with the text is forever changed by the conversation.  It 
is in this sense that the interpretive act comes full circle. This does not mean that the horizon is nec-
essarily changed; it may in fact be reinforced.  Even this scenario would not negate the fact that it is 
in some significant sense changed by the encounter with the text. (The spiral metaphor is useful in 
this context.  One’s stance toward the world is in a sense unchanged, but one’s vantage point is at a 
“higher” (that is richer) level of consciousness.  However, a modification of the horizon in light of 
the conversation is always possible. One’s prejudices are modified, deepened, or jettisoned.  Accord-
ing to Gadamer, the “new” horizon is not any less prejudicial than the old one.  (On this point, Ga-
damer would differ from Lonergan who argued that human beings are capable of becoming pro-
gressively less biased, and from the American pragmatists and Habermas, who argue that the exis-
tence of a dialogical community fosters the pursuit of the truth through rational argument.)  The 
hermeneutical circle, thus, for Gadamer, begins and ends with our “finitude” for we are ultimately 
incapable of transcending the limitations of our “historical consciousness.”  However, it is through 
our encounter with the other (including texts) that the shape and texture of our historical conscious-
ness take form.  Our finitude, which makes possible our encounter with texts, bears the imprint of 
those encounters.  This is what Gadamer refers to as the “fusion of horizons.”  
 
According to Gadamer, the hermeneutical circle requires an “openness” to what the text has 
to offer, as well as an openness to having one’s horizon transformed by it.  Within the context of the 
Signature III courses to be developed, this would involve an openness on the part of both students 
and faculty to the hermeneutical circle, in particular to modifying their disciplinary, Catholic, and 
other horizons in light of a serious conversation with the “other.”  One does not need to subscribe 
in toto to Gadamer’s position to recognize the potential usefulness of the notion of the hermeneutical 
circle in Signature III courses.  Some would object to having all horizons on a level playing field, at a 
Catholic sponsored University no less.  I am not positing any such metaphysical equivalence.  I am 
arguing on behalf of an approach that can best foster the “conversations” that need to take place in 
the academy in general, one that I would argue would advance the mission of Catholic universities 
like Seton Hall.     
                            
 
Signature Three Course: Catholicism and Art 
 
         Richard M. Liddy 
               Department of Religious Studies 
 
 
 I enjoyed very much the seminar on the Signature Three courses facilitated by John 
Haughey June 27-28.  In particular I enjoyed the chance to get to know – or to know better 
– fellow faculty members and their work.  I found the diversity of personalities as well as 
disciplines particularly engaging.  At a seminar like this one senses new possibilities of 
community than one had ever sensed before. I am grateful to my fellow participants for 
sharing themselves during these days, and I hope we can do it again. Though I entered into 
the conversation during the two days we were together, I did not mention the course I am 
thinking about for Signature Three and that is an “upgrading” of the course I presently teach 
on “Catholicism and Art.”  It is a course I teach every other year and it is part of the 
Catholic Studies program - though other students regularly take it as a free elective. 
Currently it is a 2000 level course, but I am contemplating offering it as a Signature Three 
3000 level course.  
 
My own doctoral dissertation, “Art and Feeling: The Philosophy of Art of Susanne 
K. Langer,” was on one of the foremost American philosophers of art.  Though Langer 
wrote from the 1940s through the 80s, her works are still featured by Harvard University 
Press.  My own philosophy teacher, Bernard Lonergan, leaned heavily on Langer in his work 
on the philosophy of art and in this course I regularly weave in perspectives from Langer 
and Lonergan.   
 
The course studies the role of art in Christian history as well as contemporary 
Catholic attitudes towards artistic creation and appreciation.  It considers various examples 
of early Christian, Byzantine, medieval, Renaissance and Baroque art; it also treats the 
relationship between Catholicism and modern/postmodern art and what recent cultural 
studies have called “the Catholic imagination.” Visiting speakers address the class on various 
aspects of Catholicism and art through the centuries. Regularly class trips are arranged to the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Cloisters.  
 
 The objectives of the course are: 
 
* to examine the relationships between the aesthetic/artistic patterns of 
consciousness, (“zones”) and other patterns of consciousness: ordinary, common-
sense consciousness, theoretical consciousness, religious consciousness 
with the help of Bernard Lonergan and Susanne Langer to develop a language for 
understanding art and aesthetic consciousness;  
 
* to become familiar with the history of the relationship between Catholicism and art 
 
* to become familiar with the Christian theological principles that have guided the 
relationship between Christianity and the arts: e.g. the incarnation of Christ, 
redemption, ecclesiology, sacramentality, liturgy, the historicity of culture, etc.;  
 
* to become more sensitive to the role of art in Christian life and worship today 
 
  Recently I have come across two excellent texts for the course.  One, The Clash of 
Gods by Thomas F. Mathews, professor of the history of art at New York University, 
surveys the various artistic images of Christ between the third and the sixth century and 
challenges other scholars who have used the “emperor mystique” to interpret early Christian 
iconography.  Mathews’ contention is that the context for early Christian images of Christ 
are the rival images of the ancient gods, so that Christ is presented as a magician, a 
philosopher, and an androgynous figure. The book is an excellent example of art historical 
scholarship.   
 
The second work is more a survey of the topic of Catholicism and art and is by R. 
Kevin Seasoltz, A Sense of the Sacred: Theological Foundations of Christian 
Architecture and Art.  This is more a “all you ever wanted to know” type of book on the 
whole history of the relationship between Catholicism and Art. 
 
Of course, in a course like this, what is involved is more than reading.  I encourage 
the students to seek out in person, in the museums and churches of New York and New 
Jersey, examples of the relation between Catholicism and art.  Also, today the internet makes 
available countless classic examples of Christian art.  In the first part of the course I will 
focus on ancient and medieval art and in the second part I will focus on 
modern/postmodern works.  
 
Of course, all along I will be asking the methodological question: what are we doing 
when we are doing it?  Are we having an aesthetic experience? Or are we reflecting on it in a 
theoretical way?  Are we allowing ourselves to have the experience or are we engaged in 
distracting considerations? Is the art becoming “didactic” or is there an experiential and 
expressive component here?    
 
Another question comes in for consideration: how did art, so wrapped up with 
religion in its origins, become so alienated from the Church in the Enlightenment?  What is 
the story here?  What about so-called “secular” art?  Is there a “spiritual,” indeed a 
“religious” element here?  Is there a “catholic” element to all genuine art? And can some art 
conceived under the rubric of religion be less than what might be hoped? 
Developing the Third Signature Course 
 
Vicente Medina 
Department of Philosophy 
 
I found our conversations about the development of third signature courses 
stimulating.  Despite our differences, it appears that most of us feel comfortable with the 
recommendation that these courses will be developed within specific departments.  This 
recommendation seems pedagogically sound.  Representatives of each discipline can engage 
in fruitful dialogues with the Catholic intellectual tradition from their own areas of expertise.  
In that way, we shall be able to do what we can do best, namely teach our strength.   
 
The Catholic intellectual tradition is sufficiently rich and diverse to allow faculty 
members from different disciplines to come up with interesting and challenging ideas in 
developing their 3000 level signature three courses.  I found all of the proposals or 
suggestions discussed in the seminar for new courses interesting and promising.  Some 
seemed broader in scope than others, but their depth is what really matters.  I was impressed 
by the openness and receptiveness of those colleagues who shared their views with us during 
the seminar.  A real spirit of collegiality permeated our conversations.   
 
I envision that some members of the department of philosophy will create several 
signature three courses focusing, for example, on social and political issues, epistemological 
issues, or metaphysical issues that are prominent in the Catholic intellectual tradition.  When 
I think of this tradition, the idea of social justice comes to mind; however, that is not the 
only representative issue of the tradition, even though it is unquestionably an important one.  
There are also fundamental issues such as the possibility of a virtuous life, the possibility of 
empirical knowledge or transcendental knowledge, and the idea of faith, to mention only a 
few.  Since the spirit of human inquiry is to be critical so we can be liberated from prejudices 
and false beliefs, those who choose to develop and/or teach these courses should be 
responsible for promoting in our students a passion for critical inquiry rather than a passive 
acceptance of controversial and dogmatic beliefs. 
 
My perspective differs from the one that some of my colleagues take, including the 
one assumed by the moderator John Haughey.  According to some participants, signature 
three courses ought to be informed by faith seeking understanding.  On the contrary, I 
assume that the spirit of these courses should be doubt seeking understanding.  Such 
Augustinian skepticism is congruent with the Catholic intellectual tradition.  Nonetheless, 
one could argue that those teaching these courses should have some kind of faith in the 
possibility of acquiring human knowledge.  If that were not to be the case, then our 
pedagogy would be futile.  It is precisely a belief in the possibility of human knowledge that 
characterizes the Catholic intellectual tradition.  Whether such a belief can be justified 
remains a fundamental challenge of human inquiry.  Hence, signature three courses that 
explore epistemological issues in different disciplines from critical perspectives could offer 
our students a worthwhile experience.   
 
The Catholic intellectual tradition is grounded not only on a belief that human 
knowledge is possible, but also on a belief that such knowledge is practical.  In this tradition, 
knowledge for its own sake is insufficient.  Propositional knowledge or knowledge of that 
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which is true is important to the extent that it informs our practical knowledge of how to act 
in the world.  If that is so, then one could argue that signature three courses should aim at 
explaining the relationship between theoretical and practical knowledge.  Yet our beliefs 
regarding that relationship are not necessarily impregnable.  They can be challenged.  
Intellectual honesty demands a commitment to revise our beliefs when faced with 
countervailing evidence.  To act otherwise would be to embrace obscurantism and 
dogmatism.  These are vices that ought to be overcome by representatives of any worthwhile 
tradition.   
 
It is from the assumption that human knowledge is practical and hence good that the 
Catholic intellectual tradition represents a truly ecumenical approach.  Such an approach 
embraces a distinctive conception of toleration.  Catholic or Christian toleration is not based 
on skepticism, but rather on a recognition that human knowledge is possible and yet limited 
in scope.  Our dialogical approach and respect for one another’s opinion during the seminar 
was a good example of this kind of toleration.  And yet if one accepts that there is such a 
thing as truth and that it is possible to apprehend it, then there seems to be a real tension 
between a Catholic or Christian commitment to that which is true and tolerating other set of 
beliefs which are considered to be false.  This tension is not unique to Catholic or Christian 
toleration because other traditions face similar challenges.  For example, despite its 
commitment to toleration, liberalism needs to wrestle with the presence and advocacy of 
militant intolerant groups who challenge liberal toleration.  Hence, there seems to be no 
liberal way to deal effectively with them.   
 
Apparently, those of us who choose to develop and/or teach signature three courses 
have the responsibility of explaining to our students how to reconcile truth and tolerance 
from the perspectives of our own disciplines.  But, if an instructor realizes that at times such 
reconciliation is practically or conceptually impossible, then he or she must have the courage 
and intellectual integrity to say so.  The success or failure of signature three courses would 
depend to a large extent on whether we are able to convey to our students a passion for 
critical knowledge and for intellectual integrity.  In the Catholic or Christian intellectual 
tradition this passion is based on an impeccable respect for our human dignity as actual or 
potential reasonable persons with a capacity for being free.  But there is no such a thing as a 
flawless tradition.  So, to engage our students in an honest and fruitful dialogue with the 
Catholic intellectual tradition we need to focus on both its virtues and its flaws.  A 
condescending paternalistic attitude would be anathema to the intellectual and personal 
growth of our students.  Thus, it is important to avoid a temptation to offer sanitized 





There’s More to Beethoven’s 5th Symphony than duh-duh-duh dah! 
My Take on the Third Signature Course 
 
Athar Murtuza 
School of Business 
 
The seminar was a wonderful feast for intellect—thanks for making it possible! 
 
If they are seen as discrete courses, like many if not most courses in today’s college 
environment, the three Signature courses no matter how well designed can easily turn into 
stones to step over for students, instead of being stepping stones to an educated conscious 
and informed conscience,.  What business majors pick up in their general studies courses 
stays there and does not become, for most of them, a part of their skills; business students 
for the most part, in my opinion, treat Arts and Science courses as stones to step over with 
no residual aftermath.  The third signature course could be something different if it were to 
focus on what are assumed to be business topics, but teaching them in the contexts usually 
associated with Arts and Humanities. 
 
Beethoven’s Fifth symphony is a musical miracle but its catchy opening phrase made 
up of three short notes and a long one happens to be a very small part of the total 
symphonic transcendence.  What makes the Fifth a musical miracle is how those notes are 
echoed, repeated, and reverberated throughout the symphonic transcendence made possible 
by Ludwig’s genius. Those musical notes are not stones to step over but stepping stones, a 
veritable staircase leading listeners to transcendence. The signature courses are important 
and are likely to be important stepping stones provided the lessons of those courses are 
linked and integrated with the rest of students’ university experience.   
 
The SHU’s curriculums, arts and science as well as professional ones designed for 
nurses, teachers, journalists, lawyers, diplomats, priests, professors, or even accountants will 
be better served if they are to the signature courses what the Beethoven’s 5th symphony is to 
its starting notes.  But that is not easily done—most acolytes of Mammon know of greed 
and gluttony but St. Augustine’s confession let alone the meaning of Jesus’ gospel is not 
easily or usually incorporated with the long and short of hedging. The High Priests, familiarly 
known as AACSB accreditation imperatives, seemingly could care less for all that Jazz!  The 
curriculums of business disciplines, accounting for instance, march to its own drumbeat and 
given its presumed sanctity—akin to Playboy bunnies’ look but don’t reach mystique—are 
unlikely to make social justice, let alone the Deity, a part of their quotidian.  Still the 3rd 
signature course in the context of the framework that has been designed for it, can serve or 
perhaps even subvert, by inoculating at least some accountants against a rabid propensity for 
being made into minions for greed and gluttony.  
 
My prescription for the section of the 3rd Signature course I hope to design and teach 
is aiming to ask students (presumably accounting and finance majors but not exclusively) to 
answer with the help of a semester’s worth of learning, a question: to what extent accounting 
and accountants help, (as they are indeed capable of doing) or hinder (which they often do) 
the attainment of social justice as prescribed in the Catholic social tradition as well as the 
teaching of other faiths. 
  
To make the question being asked in an accounting-grounded section of the 3rd 
signature course more real, it could be related to the kind of capitalistic dogma that does not 
blink even as 26,000 human beings die everyday from preventable causes.  The course would 
start by inculcating among students the realization that accounting not only implies counting, 
it can also represent accounting for, as in accountability.  Reaching through history, in Old 
Testament, in Babylon and back when the Valley of Kings in Egypt was kingly with 
Pharaohs and Joseph’s functions included managerial stewardship, accounting for 
accountability was extant, while accounting for financial statements to facilitate speculation, 
euphemistically called arbitrage, was not.  Accounting students need to be made aware of the 
genealogy of their profession.  After the Industrial Revolution while corporations were 
turning into behemoths, it was hoped accounting and auditing would keep them leashed for 
the sake of public interest.  Ironically, 20th Century saw corporations co-opting the 
accounting profession and the accounting pedagogy dutifully followed the wake of such 
financial titanics.  
 
Such a historical survey of the origins of accounting within a course (reading, writing, 
and critical-thought intensive) that seeks to place accounting in its evolutionary context 
before analyzing what accountants do and the extent to which they contribute to social 
justice would be a very rare (rarity being the mother-lode of profitable brand differentiation 
as marketing strategist tell us) course indeed, if ‘twere to be! Inshaa Allah!   
     
Reflections on Signature 3 and the disciplines 
 
Cheree Quizon, Ph.D. 
Department of Sociology & Anthropology 
 
 
Revisiting the notes I took of the two day seminar reinforced my initial insight that 
the best part of the experience was listening to the passion present in everyone’s teaching. 
The next best thing for me, both as a teacher and scholar, was to listen to how others 
fleshed out, in practice, ways of engaging the “Catholic intellectual tradition, broadly 
defined.” It almost seemed like Signature 3 became the site for many hopes, not only for our 
respective academic programs and for Seton Hall itself as an educational institution, but also 
for our own disciplines’ potential contribution to our students’ personal and professional 
lives.   
 
Although I have participated in our university’s curricular initiatives in some other 
ways, such as in the core “proficiencies”, I have not really been involved in the Signature 1 
and 2 courses. It is a matter of relevance, really, since there are many other colleagues who 
are in a better position, both in terms of training as well as in experience, to contribute to the 
design and teaching of these particular courses.  It is also a matter of practicality especially in 
small departments like mine with few faculty members to spare. When the invitation for 
Signature 3 came up, however, the disciplinal aspect was particularly intriguing and 
challenging. My academic and intellectual perspectives from university onwards were forged 
in large state (and proudly secular) tertiary institutions where excellence and service to others 
is a core value but not framed within specific religious traditions. Teaching from within my 
discipline with the words Catholic or Christian in the course description is an interesting 
project not only because it was not something I had not done before (since I am not an 
anthropologist of religion and my past positions were all in state universities) but also 
because my discipline itself has quite a tradition of stubborn eccentricity, even a 
methodological skepticism, where we study all human groups, the way they organize 
themselves & live their lives, and where verbal claims or narratives are always considered 
alongside actual behavior, and where “special” phenomena are always considered alongside 
the “everyday” ones that we often take for granted. So even if I was raised Catholic and 
educated until high school by Franciscan nuns who framed issues of poverty and social 
justice in very consistent, almost self-consciously “consciousness-raising” ways, my own 
religious background and practices have not explicitly informed my teaching nor my 
scholarship.  
 
Perhaps this is why alarm bells kind of rang in my head when our discussion leader, 
John Haughey, framed the Signature 3 enterprise in terms of an explicit reference to God as 
our “Co-laborer.” When John Ranieri also mentioned that model for Signature 3 shouldn’t 
be about an existing syllabus with the Catholic aspect “helicoptered in,” I really began to 
squirm, wondering if that applied to the course I was thinking about. Surely any qualified 
individual, whether believer or non-believer should be able to teach, or take, the 
anthropology course I have in mind but would that disqualify it for Signature 3?  It is not 
because I think it impossible (to teach with the starting premise of God as co-laborer in the 
classroom) but the question in my mind is, should I? I keep thinking of the current US 
President and how he makes the same revelatory arguments about his own decisions, and 
what would appear as humility in some circles rankles as arrogance in others. Knowing what 
I have come to know of the surprising diversity of our students’ spiritual beliefs and 
practices also makes me disinclined to do so. In my four years teaching at Seton Hall, so 
many of my students have opened up about their own personal beliefs and practices, writing 
very frank essays and reflections about faith, organized religion, ritual cycles, their roles in 
these events, their family contexts, the points of view of their peers. I am surprised by the 
predictability of cultural and religious backgrounds on one hand (i.e. a high proportion of 
self-identified Catholics and Christians from mainline/denominational churches) that 
contrast with a greater diversity of actual faith-based practices (i.e. a significant proportion of 
lapsed and/or hybrid religious activity). Perhaps it is because of the nature of anthropology 
that explicitly advocates for the often misunderstood perspective of cultural relativism, 
where one does not deny one’s own moral or ethical values but actively seek to understand 
the underlying ideas of any value system, and to do so with a careful and analytic eye, perhaps 
it is because of this intellectual climate in an anthropology classroom that makes students 
feel safe or find the space to share aspects of their lives without fear, shame or 
embarrassment, or to find themselves surprised to see connections with other lives lived in 
faraway places. As we read and discuss and write about what we have to in the course of the 
semester, they end up reflecting on their own spiritual journeys wherever that may lead, but 
in the end, they need the intellectual space to figure out what they want to pack for the trip.  
 
When John H. commented on the second day that we enter this world “traditioned” 
(which sounds like a good opening lecture for Introduction to Cultural Anthropology), and 
John R. pointed out that a Catholic education teaches ways of “beholding the world,”  the 
course I had in mind no longer seemed like a lost cause. Hearing from other participants 
think out loud about their own possible Signature 3 courses also helped me consider other 
possibilities in my own. Especially striking to me were the frank discussions about how the 
proposed course should address professional ethical issues head on, whether in nursing or 
accounting; how a philosophy course can be applied to the healing of the self or the sorting 
out of actual life issues; or, how the course can help students navigate competing truth 
claims whether in the context of inter-religious dialog, contemporary literature or in rituals 
of citizenship & civic life.  
 
When my turn came, it was very helpful to be forced to address a widely 
interdisciplinary group. The course I have in mind is very specific, one that seeks to answer a 
general question: What does it mean to be Catholic or Christian in cultural & geographical 
regions of the world that fall outside “the West”? What kinds of cultural formations arise 
many centuries after religious conversion especially when facilitated by larger social & 
historical forces such as colonialism or conquest? If I had to draft a working title, I would 
call it “Catholicism, Conversion & Post-Colonial Social Movements” and it can run initially 
as a 3000 level ANTH topics course.   
 
Standard teaching practice in anthropology combines reading actual field-based 
ethnographies of contemporary communities in many parts of the world, alongside 
theoretical consideration of models that help explain or analyze collective representations, 
key symbols of identity/ethnicity and ensuing social formations. I hope to apply this classic 
approach, along with a great deal of writing/journaling, preparation of their own mini-
ethnographic projects that require field work, and conventional quizzes & exams. I have 
specific book-length ethnographies and journal articles in mind that study how the 
phenomena of Catholic conversion under Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule in Asia, 
Africa & the Americas links to post-colonial social movements, especially those that frame 
their endeavors in religious terms: pasyon (for Christ’s passion) and rebolusyon (revolution) in 
late 19th century Philippines as well as the 20th century; missionary translations of Christian 
doctrine into indigenous languages in Meso-America in the 18th-19th centuries and the impact 
of the printing press in both proselytization as well as nationalist movements; the 
phenomenon of the Christianized “plantation Indian” in New England as well as the 
Hispanized Pueblo Indians of the American Southwest and the lives of their descendants, 
among others. I will need help in finding other good field-based ethnographies that touch 
upon Catholicism & conversion especially from sub-Saharan Africa (where my bibliographic 
coverage can be better) as well as in not-so-obvious places such as South Korea, Goa in 
India, the US territories in the South Pacific, or even the Christian communities in the 
Middle East.   
 
In subsequent discussion of my proposed course, I am particularly grateful for the 
many helpful references and citations that were shared by those present, such as the one on 
“operative theologies” as well as the recommended surveys/anthologies on “theologies of 
religions.” I have begun to read up on some of these and appreciate that they are part of 
others’ favorite teaching tool kits.  Whether or not this skeletal framework holds promise as 
a Signature 3 course (which I am curious to find out), I must say that I really welcome this 
seminar. It came at a very good time, mid-summer, when there is a little bit of a pause in 
teaching cycles and there is a bit more peace and languidness to stop and think about issues 
that affect our professional and personal selves.   
  
                                         
                                                 This Stuff 
 
John Ranieri 
Department of Philosophy 
 
 
About a year ago I received a call from the college age daughter of a couple I am 
friendly with in the parish where I am a weekend assistant. She had informed her parents 
that she no longer wanted to go to church. They told her that before she followed through 
on this decision she must speak to me first. If after meeting with me she still did not want to 
attend Sunday Mass, they would accept her decision. Nancy (not her real name) dutifully met 
with me and stopped going to church. During the course of our conversation she said, 
“You’re an intellectual. How can you believe this stuff?” I am not sure what she meant by 
“intellectual” so it was difficult for me to determine whether I would even want to be one. 
By “this stuff” she seemed to mean Catholic Christianity. In any case, whatever an 
intellectual was, Nancy firmly believed it excluded belief in Christianity as mediated through 
the Roman Catholic tradition. She appeared exasperated with me when I told her that I not 
only believed this stuff, but that it was the lens through which I viewed the world. From the 
look on her face I could tell that I had now been banished from the garden of the 
intellectuals.  
 
I have no doubt that, to a significant degree, the Catholic Church is responsible for 
creating the Nancys of our time. But I am also convinced that when it does so, it is being 
unfaithful to itself. The problem, however, is not that students have been indoctrinated with 
Catholic teaching and need to be liberated from the narrowness of their religious vision. In 
fact our Catholic students come to us knowing little or nothing about the Catholic 
intellectual tradition. Even the zealots among them, ever eager to guard orthodoxy against 
what they perceive as a hostile modernity, simply wind up reducing the message of 
Christianity to a position to be defended. I remember having a conversation with a student 
after the class had read scripture scholar Jerome Murphy-O’Connor’s book, Becoming Human 
Together. To my mind it is the best thing I have ever read on Paul’s understanding of 
community. At the time I was using it in class as part of a three way comparison with 
liberalism and Aristotle. The student stopped after class to say she had up until then no idea 
this was what Christianity was about. In her case, what she had come to understand was very 
appealing to her, but it is certainly conceivable in our culture that a student would come to 
understand the gospel message and decide it was not for her/him. Whether the Nancys of 
this world believe or not, whether they go to church or not, it would seem that a Catholic 
university, at the very least, has a responsibility to help them make such a decision based on 
knowledge rather than ignorance. I would add that this goal applies equally to the wisdom 
traditions of all of our students. John Haughey, during previous visits, said something to the 
effect that Seton Hall come to understand itself as a home to the faiths.  Recent 
conversations with friends and acquaintances belonging to other religions have helped me 
realize how Catholics are not the only ones living with an impoverished notion of their 
religious tradition. The vast majority of people I have encountered in pastoral ministry have 
been people of sincere good will who wish to translate their faith into action. But there is an 
enormous gap between the sophistication and depth of knowledge with which they operate 
in their professional lives, and their understanding of the religious tradition from which they 
wish to take their bearings. Why even have Catholic universities if they are unable or 
unwilling to help bridge this gap? 
 
There is a sense in which the three signature courses take their fundamental 
orientation from this dilemma. Despite their superficial openness, in my experience, our 
students inhabit incredibly narrow horizons –and not because of their religion. If they were 
to seriously engage their own traditions and those of others they might actually be deepened 
and become capable of genuine openness and adult faith. My reservations with regard to the 
current approach to the signature courses is that we are overloading them with so many 
additional tasks that we are leaving little or no space for the reflective engagement with the 
texts. I fear we will wind up ruining what might have been an opportunity for deepening in 
our students. Done well, these courses could help students and faculty realize that in 
believing “this stuff” they are being neither doctrinaire nor silly And they still might be able 
to go on to become intellectuals. 
 
 
The “Inter” in Inter-disciplinary as the Space of Possibility 
Anthony C. Sciglitano, Jr.  
Department of Religious Studies 
 
 After an enjoyable three day conversation, facilitated by John Haughey, on a 
fascinating array of Signature Three course possibilities, the inter-disciplinary character of 
the Seton Hall Signature courses became more obvious than ever. Cultural anthropology, 
sociology, political science, political theory, philosophical ideas of health, philosophy of 
religion, and psychology were represented along with their particular avenues of questioning. 
Everyone who is designing a syllabus for Signature Three is attempting to bring their 
expertise into conversation with the Catholic intellectual tradition. Thus the course is by 
definition inter-disciplinary.  
 
 What I want to reflect on here is not so much the methods of the different 
disciplines, but rather on a possible justification for inter-disciplinary discourse and what that 
“inter” might suggest to us and about us. Such reflection is not new. Bernard Lonergan’s 
Insight, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, and Hans Georg Gadamer’s Truth 
and Method stand as contemporary monuments to the importance of this endeavor. Indeed, 
apart from such arguments and justifications, calls for inter-disciplinary study and a more 
unified curriculum sound strained and shrill, perhaps fostered by various cultural and even 
territorial fears rather than reflection and a genuine desire for inquiry.1  
 
 The first thing that strikes me is that there is no reason to suppose that different 
disciplines can hold a conversation, much less support one another in an ongoing tradition 
of inquiry. Why should sociology, for instance, want to converse with psychology; why 
should economics feel a need to speak with a religious studies person? External justifications 
for this conversation, i.e., because economics effects religious practice, will not do for at 
least two reasons: first, this approach to the problem, while it holds some truth, generally 
relegates one discipline to the status of second-class citizen. If we are truly interested in 
inter-disciplinary study, then both disciplines need to be respected in their integrity. Religion 
must be encountered qua religion, and not merely as an interesting place of economic 
activity (and, of course, the other way ‘round). Second, we need to face the fact that 
historically these various disciplines often emerge in conflict with one another.2 Various 
disciplines emerge from an agonistic context where they contest the validity and viability of 
the others. I seriously doubt that all remnants of this contest have been exorcised from our 
own assumptions about how a topic should be studied or what counts as rigorous analysis.3 
Moreover, contemporary palliatives such as appeals to cultural and epistemological pluralism 
or “difference” as justifications are often pleas to be left alone rather than a genuine 
approach to the underlying issues.  
 
Yet it may be startling for the benevolent to think of academic disciplines locked in 
such a contest. I suspect we do not look across the table at our colleagues and say to 
ourselves, “Geez, they sure have nothing to contribute to the intellectual enterprise.” What 
tells against this historical agon are the actual collaborations that take place among professors 
with different areas of expertise and the inter-disciplinary work of scholars in our fields. 
Teilhard de Chardin and John Polkinghorne, for instance, joined science and theology in 
highly suggestive ways, while Clifford Geertz brought the findings of philosophy of mind 
and hermeneutics to bear on cultural anthropology. Indeed, examples abound. So our 
experience gestures toward a need to transcend one’s own discipline when the questions 
human beings ask move us beyond those boundaries. We then find ourselves moving 
between disciplines, translating our questions into another idiom and back again, and trying 
to be sure that each discipline receives its due. So it does happen; but why and how is it 
possible that it happens? As I said earlier, what I want to explore here is the “between” 
dynamic, what William Desmond might call the “metaxu” or metaxological space of thought 
such that the plurality of intellectual discourses finds its justification as a legitimate plurality.  
 
The first point of this justification is that no one discipline can provide the condition 
for the possibility of all the others. For example, sociology cannot provide for the possibility 
of a conversation between history and psychology, since this would only beg the question of 
what makes the intercourse between sociology and history possible. In addition, if one 
discipline could provide the possibility for the others, all other disciplines would need to 
recognize that they find their justification in that discipline. Here we run a serious danger of 
reductionism.  
 
Two analogies should help move our discussion along. We can begin with a chess 
game. If we ask, “what makes a chess game possible once we have all the pieces of the two 
sides,” we cannot say, “another side.” Now we would have three sets of pieces and still no 
game. Rather, something qualitatively different from the two sides is necessary: a board and 
game rules. And the game rules have everything to do with how the two sides negotiate the 
space (board) that allows them to play: a pawn can move one square forward at a time, save 
for its first move and when it captures an opponent’s piece; a bishop can only move 
diagonally, and it cannot move as a rook does, etc. Thus the board makes the game possible, 
just as a court does for basketball teams, a field for baseball, etc. So the condition for the 
possibility of game intercourse, so to speak, is something qualitatively different from the two 
sides in the game itself, namely, a field of play.   
 
More illuminating yet is the form of intercourse that is human sexual relations. What 
makes sexual intercourse possible is certainly not a third person—for that would simply beg 
the question as when we added another disicipline—nor only one of the partners, but rather 
an underlying field of play, in this case, their common species-being or humanity and the 
particular erotic drive built into it. We can push this line of inquiry a bit further. Human 
being, or human nature, is not a third being in our series, but the field of play that makes 
possible properly human sexual relations (we can thus restrict our metaphysical bed to a 
Queen size). In addition, human nature is neither one nor the other partner. Nor do both 
together add up to human being or exhaust it. One partner is not half of human nature, but 
rather participates in the unity that is human nature without ever exhausting its possibilities. 
No one human being, or even one million, exhaust the possibilities for being human.  
 
Now a second point becomes equally important. While human sexual relations point 
to a shared nature, that nature shows up nowhere but in actual human beings. One does not 
have erotic intentions toward human nature as such, but with Sally, Padma, or Sean. So, 
human nature depends upon particular human beings for its realization or existence, and 
particular human beings are finite events or occurrences of the infinite possibilities inherent 
to human nature. Moreover, both sexual and intellectual intercourse becomes possible 
through a common ground in nature that both unifies and distinguishes the dialogue 
partners. It unifies in that both are human beings, and differentiates in that each are different 
realizations of human being where neither can be reduced to the other.  
 
I have limited the discussion here to the human species, but only because we are 
working our way back to a discussion of inter-disciplinary study, which, so far as I know, is 
not of concern to hamsters or cats. The argument, then, is that the field that makes these 
different types of intercourse possible is indeed the field called metaphysics. Now, this is 
where care needs to be taken. By metaphysics, I do not mean this or that view of essences or 
natures or even will, though all of these will require discussion. This kind of metaphysics 
would not so much be the space on which other disciplines play as another disciplines itself. 
For reasons stated above, this would not solve our dilemma.  
 
At a more primal level, I would argue, metaphysics springs from two forms of love: 
eros and agape, love that desires and love that serves. It is this that forms the playing field for 
our different discursive endeavors now to be understood as different ways of inquiring into 
the meaning of Being. We can speak of both forms of love in subjective and in objective 
terms.  
 
Eros (subjectively speaking): As children, we explore our world, its corners, crevices, 
and colors in a desire to map it, understand it, and negotiate it. We desire to know and to be 
known by others in our truest intentions and in our goodness. Oddly enough, apart from 
being known (by parents, siblings, friends), our existence narrows to near nothingness. So we 
desire communication, and we desire that those with whom we communicate grasp our 
meaning, purpose, and concerns.4 We can see the intensity of this desire for communication  
by way of the contrasts provided by experts in alienation: Edward Hopper paintings and 
Michelangelo Antonioni films display the inability to reach out to others and communicate. 
The characters move us by their immobility. So this desire is evident to the extent that it 
finds fulfillment, but also to the extent to which we are misunderstood or discursively 
paralyzed, Babel-like, in various and painful ways. Subjectively speaking, then, Eros signifies a 
self-transcending desire for communication, recognition, and communion (as in, koinonia, 
participation). Nor do we restrict ourselves to the bare necessities of social intercourse; 
rather, we stretch out and communicate about the world that presents itself to us, about 
things trivial and profound, and we seek not merely to exist, but joy itself—true communion.  
 
Agape (or Love as service--subjectively speaking): In trying to know and 
communicate our world, we serve two masters (but ultimately only one!). The first master is 
the world around us. To know something is to give oneself over to it before doing anything 
else—to allow it space within oneself to open up and breathe and come into the light of the 
intellect. To believe that one can know something, that the world is knowable, is, of course, 
a fundamental trust that the world is both intelligible and worth knowing. It is to pronounce 
the wonder with which most of us begin our intellectual endeavors a genuine good. Thus we 
serve the world by opening a space within our intellect to it, bringing it into the light of 
knowledge, language, and image, and thus not only reflecting it, but in some sense creating it. 
The effort to know is fundamentally an effort to serve what presents itself to be known and 
to give that subject of knowledge over to language. This knowing, it should be said, is a 
knowing from somewhere, a knowing that shapes the known and is also shaped by it as 
reality resists efforts to completely manipulate it. A conversation is a good example here. 
Nothing is more frustrating than speaking with someone and having them completely, and 
perhaps willfully, misconstrue one’s meaning. Reading and writing form other examples. We 
all say to students, “I think you’ve misread that” or “I don’t think that’s what you mean to 
say.”5  
 
Eros (objectively): If it is true that like Christina in the famous Wyeth painting we all 
stretch towards a horizon, then perhaps it is also true that the world has always already 
reached out to us (indeed, in us). The world comes to us primarily in images, sounds, and 
smells that disclose underlying and infinite possibilities. A more formal way of saying this is 
that Being is given to us in particular forms of being and particular realizations of those 
forms. Being is given as the species dog and as this particular dog, Sophie. Only through 
meeting Sophie, and others like her, does the human being encounter the dog species/nature 
and hence one of the gifts of Being. But by no means do we say that this dog is the only 
possibility inherent to dog-nature. Rather, Sophie points us to other dogs and other 
possibilities that reflect the abundance and surprising nature of Being. The number of 
possibilities increases as a species is capable of greater individualization and self-
consciousness. Moreover, Being seems to have a drive—a “desire”—to express itself and be 
known somewhat like human beings do. This may sound odd, but if we think that we are not 
entirely different from the animal kingdom and the world around us, then it should not be so 
difficult to imagine that the human desire for communion is not absent in an analogical 
sense from the rest of Being. Indeed, in being known, Being comes to the fulfillment at its 
heart. Yet being known is never a static reality; knowing a particular thing is to know how 
the abundance of Being gives itself and that Being is gift. Knowing the abundance of Being 
as gift is to always point to the inexhaustible riches that can surprise and overwhelm the 
knower—Being is mystery in its very giving of itself for knowledge. Being is mystery as 
surplus.  
 
Agape (objectively): If human beings serve the world through knowledge and will, it 
is also the case that the world makes possible genuine human being as service. In other 
words, without a world that gives itself to and for human knowledge, the human eros towards 
communication and communion would be left without a partner. Agape, here, also speaks to 
the indifference of Being in its giving. Being in its variety, color, majesty, and in its smallest, 
most seemingly prosaic details gives itself to the poor and rich, the just and unjust, the petty 
and the magnanimous. Being gives itself universally and without deference to the character 
or status of the beholder (whether it is beheld is a different story). The attempt to be 
indifferent to one’s self or one’s self-interest is likewise the call of the intellectual in her act 
of knowing. One first tries to bring to light whatever presents itself in all its dimensions, just 
as one tries to do justice to the position of an interlocutor. Everything else is ideology and 
ego.  
 
Disciplinary Intercourse:  
 
What does all this have to do with inter-disciplinary study and its possibility? Inter-
disciplinary study involves the presupposition that the disciplines should not be reduced to 
one über-discipline, and that no one discipline, alike to the others, can provide the 
conditions for inter-disciplinary study. Rather, I am suggesting, it is the nature of Being and 
the nature of being human wrapped up in the forms of love as desire and service that makes 
inter-disciplinary study both possible and desirable. In this sense, all the disciplines should 
view themselves as naturally opening onto a broader and more expansive web of Being than 
all the disciplines, let alone any one, can ever account for. Moreover, if the human being is a 
form of erotic openness and agapaic service in its very core, then it will be inclined to ask 
questions—provided something does not block this—that transcend the ability of their 
particular discipline and sends them screaming into the opening that they share with all the 
other disciplines, the opening into the depths. The sociologist, after all, is not merely a 
sociologist, but also a human person concerned with issues of psychological health and 
economic viability. The theologian might ask why there is evil in the world in a general sense, 
but this question will always also direct him to particular forms of economic, geo-political, 
and social evil occurring in history. It is the excess of Being and the nature of human being, 
then, that justifies forays outside our chosen disciplines and justifies a plurality of disciplines, 
which is to say, conversely, that a reduction to one discipline would be to betray the various 
ways in which Being can and should be known.6  
 
We can finish with two observations: first, in our discussion at least, knowing is 
inherently tied to love and service. Outside of this, knowledge itself can turn demonic. 
Second, this relation of knowledge and love only makes sense insofar as Being itself is 
viewed as a gift, as an intelligible and valuable reality that is worth loving. This means, then, 
that at root intellectual intercourse properly rests upon an approach more fundamental than 







                                                 
1  In this atmosphere, proponents of a more unified curriculum decry the fragmentation of 
knowledge, the demise of a pedagogical telos or purpose for education, the severing of any but the most 
superficial of links—be sure to take that ethics course!—between college education and a well-lived life, 
and the painful lack of basic knowledge or cultural literacy students can claim after spending an absurd 
amount of money on their education. All of this lends credence to the not necessarily Marxist feeling that 
education merely serves to marry up and off members of various classes and prepare young people for 
their rightful place in the world of cubicles, sports radio, manicured lawns, and piles of bills—in short, a 
life of quiet misery. Arguments against inter-disciplinary classes often focus on the lack of expertise this 
implies, coupled again to issues of educational larceny. After all, it seems unreasonable or worse to present 
a student who pays $25,000 per year with a course taught by a non-expert. An argument for inter-
disciplinary courses can hardly be an argument for ignorance or theft. Other “arguments against” involve 
more practical matters such as tenure requirements and time to publish in one’s field—say, linguistics—
while trying to learn Dante for Signature Course 1. A longer piece would need to address these issues.  
2 Philosophy emerges as a spiritual corrective or purification of myth, and myth will rebel and try to 
swallow philosophy; sociology, at least in its Comtean and Marxist forms, has little truck with theology or 
psychology.  Philosophy and poetry knock heads again in the modern Enlightenment versus Romanticism 
                                                                                                                                                 
flare ups. Each discipline or discourse either contests its opponents ability to say something cogent about 
reality or relegates them to a superstructure or epiphenomenal role in some larger system. 
3  Claims, for instance, that evolutionary biology fully explains human behavior (E.O. Wilson), that 
sociology “really” explains human beings as opposed to psychology, that all human endeavors stand on a 
base of economic structures and everything else is superstructure (Marx, and the recent book, 
Freakonomics) each marginalize other disciplines or types of discourse in some form or another.  
4 I would also argue that this desire for communion emerges from a communion that is given prior or 
with the original desire. Thus communion is present in some early stage prior to individuation.  
5 I recall a student, writing on sex in marriage alone, in an exasperated tone, asking, “And what if it’s 
monogamous?” She of course meant “monotonous.” I didn’t feel a need to answer either question. Here 
we can observe a difference between eros and agape, and perhaps link the two as well. Eros springs from a 
need, whereas agape responds to a need. Eros moves a person beyond themselves so that they can acquire 
a world; agape then seeks to serve the world by giving itself (in intellect and will) over to it. Both are good; 
both are necessary. 
6 A more rigorous and lengthy treatment would need to discuss the different methods and their ways of 
approaching Being (i.e., history studies Being as it is known in terms of time). 
 
Signature Course Three Seminars- Response Paper 
 
Theodora Sirota, Ph.D, APRN, BC 




Attending the signature course three seminars was a satisfying and highly instructive 
experience for me. I was able to meet and enjoy dialogue with faculty members from many 
other disciplines within the University.  Hearing others’ points of view and perspectives on 
the aims of Catholic education as well as how this can be accomplished within the various 
disciplines allowed me to observe the breadth of intellectual and practical creativity 
exemplified by the diverse body of faculty members who attended. As a Jewish woman 
(albeit one who is rather familiar with the basic teachings of the Catholic church,) I learned 
more deeply about the Catholic intellectual point of view and how this can be best translated 
into the basic education of all Seton Hall University undergraduate students.  I came away 
with the view that our aim in developing the third signature course is to teach students how 
Catholic intellectual tradition can inform their learning within any particular academic 
discipline along with the mandate to help students discover how their own particular area of 
specialization can be experienced as engaged in reaching out to human wholeness.   We 
would also strive toward helping students access a personal (and, in my view, 
transformational) sense of G-d as collaborator in their intellectual development. 
 
However, I must say that my strongest impression of the entire experience was 
witnessing and being a part of a faculty group that conveyed a deep dedication to the 
intellectual growth of our students within the Catholic tradition.  The group process itself 
felt somewhat like a religious experience.  I could feel the University’s mission and 
philosophy come alive in the values and thinking expressed by seminar participants 
(something one often doesn’t feel so closely in our day-to-day activities!)  I felt deeply 
moved by the degree of commitment and spirituality expressed within the group and by our 
facilitator, John.  
 
 In nursing we are educating students for practice where they will necessarily come in 
daily contact with important questions about human existence.  Nursing practice touches the 
full range of human thought, belief and experience.  Our students will be called upon to deal 
directly with life, health and illness, dying and death.  Students need to be able to confront 
and share the deeply personal and emotional issues people face as they deal with difficult 
medical diagnoses, pain, suffering and care choices that are often hard for patients to 
process.  Nurses are directly involved with issues of sexuality and reproduction, suicide, 
euthanasia and genetic engineering as well as the full range of emotional struggles people go 
through as they cope with health issues, including anger, shame, self-loathing, guilt over sin, 
concerns about forgiveness and redemption, anger at G-d and loss of faith.   
 
It is clear that Catholic intellectual and religious teachings, directly focused as they 
are on all of these elements of our work, have much to offer nurses as they develop their 
identity as caretakers and learn appropriate responses to patient need. All student nurses 
need to clarify and develop a clear sense of personal belief and values in relation to their 
practice. Additionally, nurses need to learn the ways in which a strong religious perspective 
can us develop and maintain a consistent patient-centered identity and firm humanistic 
approach to our work in the face of today’s health care climate, which is too often 
impersonal and income-driven.  
 
 In my experience in nursing education, I find that students often fail to make the 
connection between how content learned in various support courses may be integrated into 
learning the nursing process.  Also, although most students may have had a basic religious 
education (Catholic or otherwise), I often find it surprising that so many of them start out 
not thinking too deeply about how religious teachings do and should inform our work.  I 
believe that it is critical that students learn and fully understand that religious teachings can 
and do inform the very heart of nursing practice.   
 
Therefore, students need to integrate the intellectual skills that will enable them to 
critically examine health care issues in the light of religious thought for application 
throughout their career.  In a Catholic institution such as Seton Hall University, it is 
appropriate and expectable that all nursing students leave with a firm ability to understand 
how Catholic religious teachings inform health care.  Obviously, in nursing it is also 
important that students learn and respect other religious and cultural traditions as well.   
While educated in a foundation of Catholic religious belief, they need to be able to compare 
and critique a range of other belief systems.  The third signature course in nursing will 
provide the opportunity for students to gain this important knowledge and skills.  It will help 
them translate the information they learned about the Catholic intellectual and religious 
tradition in the first two signature courses into outcomes consisting of a) nursing identity 
development, b) informed, appropriate responses to patient need c) developing a coherent 
value system, informed by Catholic intellectual tradition, regarding major health care issues 
of our time. 
 
 Listening to other seminar participants’ discussion about how they might develop 
courses within their particular disciplines, I was able to mentally sketch out how our course 
might look.  I envision various sections of the course, each covering an important health 
care topic that requires application of religious dialogue and understanding, emphasizing the 
Catholic intellectual perspective.  For example, the course might include such topics as a) 
death and dying, b) pain and suffering, c) health care controversies such as suicide, 
euthanasia, family and reproductive planning, d) spirituality in health and illness, e) culture in 
health and illness, f) abuse (domestic, elder, child, etc).  Teaching methods could include 
some lecture, much discussion over case studies and clinical vignettes illustrating various 
issues within the topics, role-playing to help students learn interactive skills with patients to 
help them “live” the situations under discussion, use of journaling to help students process 
their own feelings and value-development in relation to the topics and religious teachings as 
well as aid in their own spiritual development and readings and other assignments that will 
help clarify and aid discussion about the relation of Catholic and other religious traditions to 
the issue of health care.  Class discussion that will help students examine and clarify their 
own spiritual beliefs and values will be emphasized, especially as they relate (or possibly 
don’t relate) to Catholic teachings.   
 
 We will submit an outline by summer’s end and will work in committee to fully 
develop our third signature course. Attending the seminars was exceedingly helpful in 
directing our efforts and I am pleased to have had the opportunity to do so.   
           
  Core Curriculum Seminar on the Third Signature Course 
 
Judith Chelius Stark, Ph.D. 
Department of Philosophy 
 
  
 The core curriculum seminar on the third Signature Course provided us faculty with 
a wonderful and fruitful opportunity to discuss and debate many of the fundamental 
questions that, undoubtedly, will come to be included in a variety of ways in these courses 
themselves.  Like any good seminar leader, John Haughey S.J. proposed many provocative 
questions for us to consider without finessing or forcing any preconceived results.  In these 
ways, he provided us with the opportunity to engage and challenge each other as we worked 
out some preliminary ideas about how we might begin to construct  proposals for the third 
Signature Course for the new university core curriculum. Since we had the opportunity to 
discuss these ideas outside the ordinary contexts of meetings for the usual business of 
departments and the college, we were able to engage in frank and open discussions about the 
intersections of religious faith and the methodologies of our own disciplines.  This process is 
both fraught and fruitful in my discipline of philosophy. 
 
 The fact that this seminar included colleagues from a number of disciplines, 
including some outside the humanities and social sciences, made the exchanges that much 
more valuable and enriching.  Without minimizing our differences or reaching for superficial 
and inadequate commonalities, I believe that we were able to listen, appreciate and disagree 
in ways that often are neither sought out or valued sufficiently among us faculty. In fact, I 
think the seminar mirrored and expressed some of the best qualities of informed, critical, 
and appreciative academic discourse that stands at the heart of university life.  While 
engaging in this conversation among ourselves on these topics of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition, broadly understood, we set ourselves the task of continuing this conversation and 
of inviting our students to join us in the courses we may develop for the core curriculum.   
 
 As a result of participating in the seminar, I began to think more deeply about three 
areas in particular:  first, the qualities of mind and hear that enhance the academic 
conversation; second, the relationship between my discipline of philosophy and the Catholic 
intellectual tradition; and third, the course that I plan to develop on philosophy and social 
justice for the third Signature course.  
 
The Academic Conversation 
 
 Since our academic project is cooperative and communal, as well as individual and 
solitary, I pondered the qualities that would enhance effective communication in the 
academic conversation. Although these may seem very obvious, I wondered how much 
explicit notice we gave them in the teaching-learning process by calling attention to them in 
the classroom--openness, attentive listening, self-criticism, and mindful speech.  We expect 
our students to be open to new knowledge, information, and ways of organizing and 
examining knowledge in methodical ways, but how open are we faculty to having our habits 
of mind and pre-suppositions challenged?  Are we open to being persuaded to abandon 
some of our cherished notions and to change our minds?  How well do we actively listen 
and encourage our students to do likewise, and not just rush into the gap of the conversation 
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with the next point we want to make? With the airwaves and cyberspace abuzz with blogs, 
chatter, and “chat rooms”, how well equipped are we to distinguish among those claims and 
conversations that are worth listening to?  Self-criticism involves both inner-directed 
awareness and outer-directed gathering of information and knowledge.  How do we create 
coherent and consistent views that are rigorous, well-examined, and also open to revision 
when necessary?  Finally, in our responses to others in the conversation, are we mindful and 
careful in our speech, choosing and using our words to advance the communal search for 
greater understanding and truth, and not simply for display or scoring debating points? 
 
Catholic Intellectual Tradition 
 
 Within the first few centuries of Christianity, the early church fathers began using 
philosophical concepts and principles in the task of “faith seeking understanding.”  
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.) was one of the major architects of the grand synthesis of 
Christianity and Neoplatonism that held sway for almost a millennium in the western 
tradition. In fact, the Catholic intellectual tradition is intellectual precisely to the extent to 
which these early authors used philosophical methods as ways to understand and explore the 
meanings and implications of their religious faith.  The creation of this synthesis was not 
without its critics and detractors, for example witness Tertullian’s reposte:  “What does 
Athens have to do with Jerusalem?”  Nevertheless, the works of Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas (among many others) attest to the conjunction of philosophy and theology that has 
come to inform the Christian tradition to this day. With the rise of modern science and 
modernity itself, philosophy and many other disciplines no longer serve as “handmaidens to 
theology,” but the questions posed within the Catholic intellectual tradition continue to rely 
on the clarity and cogency of philosophical methods. Tracing and exploring this on-going 
relationship between contemporary philosophy and the Catholic intellectual tradition, 
especially in the light of the crises of modernity and the loss of “easy faith” (Bonhoeffer) 
would itself constitute a fruitful enterprise for the third Signature course.  However, it is not 
the one that I would develop at this point (I think one of my colleagues in the department 
may be interested to propose this topic).  The one that I am interested to propose is briefly 
described below. 
 
Philosophy and Social Justice 
 
 From its inception, a strong component of the Catholic intellectual tradition, broadly 
understood, has been its concern for social justice and the on-going tensions between the 
imperatives of the Gospel and the claims of the dominant culture.  Ever since Jesus first 
uttered his famous line “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the 
things that are God’s,” Christian followers have been working out how to live “in the world, 
but not of the world.”  This is not the kind of issue that can be solved once and for all, as 
Augustine himself realized when he wrote his masterpiece The City of God  in which he 
rendered the claims of ultimacy of both imperial Rome and triumphalist Constantinian 
Christianity equally suspect. The course I will work on would look at the roots of 
Augustine’s critique of these claims and his development of a Christian philosophy of history 
as the foundation for exploring the principles and concerns of social justice in the 
contemporary world, including, for example, papal documents, documents of the Second 
Vatican Council, American Catholic bishops’ pastoral letters, writings of authors like Karl 
Rahner, Thomas Merton, and Dorothy Day. 
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 By developing this course, I hope to invite students into the excitement and vitality 
of the academic conversation by engaging their minds and hearts in studying the 
contributions of the best of the Catholic intellectual tradition, especially as it has been put to 
the test in the contemporary world. 
 
 I am grateful to have had the opportunity to discuss the many issues that were raised 
during the seminar and especially thankful for the thoughtful and wise words of our seminar 
leader, Rev. John Haughey. I look forward to continuing these conversations as we move 
into the full implementation of the core curriculum in the next few years.                  
 Reflections on “Developing the Third Signature Course”  
Yvonne Unna 
Department of Philosophy 
 
 
The question that struck me most during our conversation was John Haughey’s  
simple question “What are we going to do about the mess we are in?” which he raised in the 
context of our brief excursion to the topic of salvation. It seems to me that this question can 
be understood as entailing, in a nutshell, all those questions that could serve as a blueprint 
for the design of a third signature course. Let me explain this.  
 
One line of interpretation of the question could run as follows: The mess “we are in” 
is not a fictional mess. It is a real mess, otherwise we would not “be in it” (I am excluding 
Anthony’s “certifiably insane” aunt). Since the “we” refers to all those who grapple with this 
question in one way or another, in other words to those who regard themselves as being 
addressed by the question, the mess is a problem common to “us”. Furthermore, since “we” 
are in a mess, we are not alone in it but face it together. And finally, since we are together in 
a real mess, facing a problem common to us, we have to decide what it is we want to do 
about it.   
 
Though we were asked to write the response to the work shop from the perspective 
of our “own discipline,” I have chosen to provide a personal response as a student and 
teacher of philosophy not as a representative of the discipline which is simply too vast a 
field. 
 
As a Kantian, I am very much influenced by Kant’s call to practice and authenticity. 
In his lecture on “Philosophische Enzyklopädie” Kant recounts Plato’s admonishment of an old 
man who told him that he had listened to his lectures on virtue. According to Kant, Plato 
asked the man: “When will you begin to live a virtuous life”?  Commenting on Plato’s 
response, Kant stresses that “one should not always speculate” but always put the results of 
this speculation into practice. However, most philosophical prescriptions of how one ought 
to live are unbearable to listen to laments Kant, because “they do not show us any means” of 
how to fulfill them.  (AA 29.1,1: 12, 8). 
 
I am mentioning this passage because I see the third signature course as an 
opportunity to discuss the means employed by philosophers and Catholic thinkers alike to 
help us live a good life. The tentative title of this course is “Philosophy and Therapy.” For 
the purpose of this particular course, the key questions outlined above, would provide the 
following road map: Given our imperfections as human beings and their often horrific 
consequences (“the mess we are in”) how can we (meaning all those who are concerned 
about this question) go about improving ourselves.   
 
One major focus of the course would be the literature on spiritual exercises (Ignatius 
of Loyola, Stoics, Epicureans). Spiritual exercises can be understood as therapeutic devices 
aimed at the improvement of the self for the purpose of living a moral life. Pierre Hadot, for 
example, in his book Philosophy as a Way of Life stresses that the rich tradition of spiritual 
exercises of Greco-Roman antiquity can be put to use in the twenty first century. Hadot 
claims that Ignatius of Loyola’s Exercitia Spiritualia simply constitute a Christian version of 
this Greco –Roman tradition, a claim that has to be scrutinized.  
 
Even though the guidelines for creating a Signature III course ask that the course 
should focus on the dialogue between the Catholic intellectual tradition and the respective 
discipline, other religious traditions may also be covered. It would be contrary to the spirit of 
the guiding question, if in answering the question of this particular human problem we 
would not enter into a dialogue with all those, who because they ask and attempt to answer 
the same question are included in the “we.” I certainly would like to engage other religions 
such as Judaism (here come to mind, for example, the Therapeutae a group of Jewish ascetics 
described by Philo in De vita contemplativa) and would appreciate it very much, if you would 
let me know of any relevant texts from other religious traditions.   
 
This course, as I envision it, develops themes from Signature Courses I and II as 
required by the guidelines. The idea of self-knowledge for the purpose of self-improvement 
is the focal point of Plato’s Apology read in Signature I. The connection between faith 
(religion) and reason (philosophy) that provides the horizon for the course I propose to 
teach is considered in Signature II.  
 
Let me end these brief reflections by thanking all of you for two enjoyable and 
enlightening mornings. It was a great opportunity to meet those of you I never had a chance 
of meeting before and I sincerely hope that we will be able to continue our interdisciplinary 
exchange of ideas in the future.  
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“Give us ‘understanding’ of our understanding” 
Gisela Webb 
Department of Religious Studies 
 
I have never experienced a faculty retreat facilitated by John Haughey that was not 
an opportunity for great camaraderie as well as intellectual and spiritual growth.  I am 
forever grateful for these opportunities.  
 
I came to the CORE III workshop with an idea for a course that would reflect an 
aspect of the Catholic intellectual tradition that has been critically important to me, and that 
is “Interreligious Dialogue,” an enterprise that had its modern academic roots in the era of a 
post- Vatican II, post-Holocaust commitment to seek understanding of “self and other” in a 
commitment to human knowing and justice in the face of historical ignorance, chauvinisms 
and violence toward the projected “other.”  I was fortunate to have been a graduate student 
in Temple University’s Religion Department during the 1980’s when the likes of Gerard 
Sloyan, Leonard Swidler, (Catholics), Zalman Schachter (Jewish), and Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
(Muslim), Bibhhuti Yadav (Hinduism/Buddhism), John Raines and Thomas Dean (students 
of Niebuhr and Tillich), were teaching courses in their own disciplines while organizing 
public seminars with History of Religion/Comparative religion scholars such as Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, Hans Kung, and others.  That era of “Interreligious Dialogue” did not bring 
the political progress its participants may have hoped for, and, in fact, the project has waned. 
Indeed there are many reasons that might have led to this stagnancy: perhaps the inability of 
academic ‘dialogue’ on Israel/Palestine to effect sufficient on-ground progress in the long 
Israeli/Palestinian crisis; perhaps the glaring omission of women’s voice in early 
institutionally based ‘dialogue’ for a needed to be addressed.  Sadly, the last two decades have 
seen a rise of Jewish, Christian, Islamic, and Hindu fundamentalisms of various sorts.   
 
My sense is that it is time to revamp what a course in Interreligious Dialogue could 
and should be in this era, particularly here in a Catholic institution in the middle of the global 
hub of cultural, racial, and religious diversity of the Newark-New York area.  I have 
experimented with an Interreligous Dialogue course in two different venues, one with 
undergraduates at Seton Hall (junior level honors students, mostly Catholic), the other with 
graduate students in Indonesia’s Ghadja Mada University (mostly Muslim, but also 
Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus). What seemed to work , and what I would propose for 
this third core course in Religious Studies at Seton Hall-- is one that begins with 
Comparative Religions/Phenomenology readings (a comparative theologies model) so that 
students can see philosophers’, theologians’, and social scientists’ perspectives on the 
common structures that religion—the human quest for meaning—seems to take. We would 
look at primary sources in religions to see the narratives that inform constructions 
(theological, philosophical, ethical, social) –and their development of interpretations over 
time. (I know I would want to do a serious comparative mysticism section, especially 
Christian and Muslim developments). Finally, a contemporary interreligious dialogue would 
need to look at on-ground social, economic, and environmental ills, and utilize comparative 
ethics and social justice commitment to see how the our global community can find ways to 
work together across religious lines. 
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Moreover, I think there is an obvious service learning component to this course in 
terms of investigation of /creation of /participation in on-ground dialogues, interfaith/inter-
ideological/ discussions on a range of issues, as they arise, and community programs related 
to political, racial, social, economic, environmental justice. (David Burrell from Tantur 
Ecumenical Center ‘just outside Jerusalem on the way to Bethlehem’ has spoken to us of the 
Jewish/Christian/Muslim work done—both theoretical and on-ground—toward resolving 
terrible long-standing and new problems in Israel/Palestine. There are several interfaith 
service organizations wanting to link not only at a theological level, but at the level of praxis. 
My course in Indonesia, the questions of religious truth/orthodoxies/praxis led to requests 
for “special topics dialogues” to discuss intra-religious issues, for example ethical questions 
involved in ‘conversion’ goals and tactics of Christians, and issues of gender and sexual 
orientation within their traditions, proper (ethical, humane) ministry to poor. Catholics and 
Muslims (from Java to Papua) together formed sex education groups for the poor, especially 
geared toward the causes of prostitution. The development of such a course has a legacy in 
the Religious Studies Department, with Father Jack Radano being asked to go to Rome in 
the 1980’s to set up actual interreligious dialogues among and within traditions (Christian-
Jewish, Christian-Muslim) at the Vatican. We can continue that legacy of our department, 





INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE:  Theories/Practices 
“BEYOND HEAVEN OR HELL, IN OR OUT, TRUE OR FALSE” 
CORE III Course 2008      Instructor: Dr. Gisela Webb 
 
Considering theologian Hans Kung’s claim that there can be ‘no global peace 
without peace among religions’, in this course we will look at---and participate in-- the 
phenomenon of inter-religious dialogue, seeking answers to such questions as: What is the 
nature of religious language, experience, and truth claims? Are there common structures or core beliefs that all 
religions share? Do all religions share a ‘mystical’ core that could bridge the divide among religions? How is 
inter-religious dialogue used today in service of common social justice mandates across religions, such as 
economic justice, ecological care, women’s rights, and peace?   
 
Readings include selected texts representing comparative religionists, theologians, 
and human rights activists on inter-religious dialogue. ( E.g.,  William James, Rudolf Otto, 
Mircea Eliade, Wilfred Cantwell Smith John Paul II, Hans Kung, DuWei-Ming, , Bernard 
Lonergan, Paul Knitter, Farid Esack, Zalman Schachter,  Paul Tillich, Hisamatsu,  Maseo 
Abe, Seyyed Hossein Nasr,)  as well as primary texts several religious traditions.  
 
